Gas Network Code in Romania

Transaction, a must for the future of the gas sector

A fully functioning and interconnected internal energy market is crucial for maintaining security of energy supply, increasing competitiveness and ensuring that all consumers can purchase energy at affordable prices. Europe’s cross-border gas networks operate according to rules that regulate who can use them and under what conditions. In the past, these rules were drawn up nationally. However, with increased interconnections and trade between countries in the internal energy market, EU-wide rules have become increasingly necessary to effectively manage gas flows. These rules, known as network codes or guidelines, are legally binding European Commission implementing Regulations. They govern all cross-border gas market transactions.

Each year, the European Commission draws up an ‘annual priority list’ of areas to be included in the development of network codes for electricity, with input from a public consultation. The Commission, with further input from the Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) and the European Network of Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG), adopts proposals for network codes. The proposals for network codes are checked by a Gas Cross-Border Committee of specialists from national energy ministries and then adopted with the approval of the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament.

 

Rebuilding the gas sector

The natural gas sector in Romania is characterized by numerous failures, dissatisfactions, abuses, disorientation etc.

The fact is that Things must change. But how? What? Where? Who? When?

Any vision on the natural gas sector has to start from the need to rebuild it, from scratch, step by step, by placing the TRANSACTION in the centre of the future construction of the new gas sector.

Last year, the Intelligent Energy Association launched a country project called ‘Starting over in the gas market in 10 steps’, in order to build a real market and remove the pseudo market that is first of all detrimental to gas consumers.

Recently, within the Round Table Meeting organized by the Intelligent Energy Association together with the Energy-Center.ro publication, with the topic: “We can have a fair gas price only with an objective Network Code and a functional market”, carried out at the Chamber of Commerce and Industries of Bucharest (CCIB), the participants answered 3 essential questions:

1. Do we need a Network Code in Romania?
2. What are the causes of non-functioning of the current Network Code in Romania?
3. What should we do to have a functional Network Code in Romania?

If at the first question the answer was unanimously positive, even if some participants put it under the sign of obligation imposed by the European Union, at the second question there were several causes resulting from the speeches, which we summarized below.

1. Physical configuration of the current NTS and adjacent systems
2. Legislative framework antagonistic to the Network Code
3. Incomplete and incoherent text of the Network Code
4. Nonexistence of flexibility mechanisms in the Romanian gas market
5. Lack of IT platforms and modality for data transmission
6. Sabotage of the Network Code implementation process
7. Incompetence

 

1. Physical configuration of the current NTS and adjacent systems

What is currently named NTS is in fact a mixture of transmission systems: closed (local, of source-consumption type), semi-closed (regional) systems and a ‘0’ transmission system.

Thus, rules suitable for the ‘0’ system are not appropriate for the closed or semi-closed systems (differences of technical, hydraulic, operational, functional nature etc.).

Moreover, the current code treats systems that do not communicate physically as if they would communicate physically, respectively there is a manipulation of the idea of physical balance in the NTS, but in reality, it is only an arithmetic illusion.

The Code will be applicable only on a homogeneous system. But re-engineering is required not only for the NTS, but also for the other adjacent systems.

 

2. Legislative framework antagonistic to the Network Code

• Lack of equitable, fair, non-discriminatory mechanisms in line with the provisions of the Civil Code, for the allocation of the amounts supplied for:
• Individualizing the quantities sold;
• Allowing suppliers to monitor their own commodity on the procurement-transmission-storage-transmission circuit, and being able to request them to be disciplined in the market and in the transmission activity;
• Having an alignment with the allocation modality in the Transmission Network Code and allowing the matching of quantities;
• Having an alignment with the modality of allocation of distributed or stored quantities.
• Lack of Distribution Network Codes, as a set of rules, determining the responsibilities and rights of the parties, as well as the manner in which gas flow continuity must be ensured in the transmission system to the end-consumer, penalties charged or from which the user of the distribution system benefits.
• Lack of the market model, containing clear rules, procedures and instructions in terms of gas trading and interaction of suppliers with shippers (allowing the monitoring of the flow in real time throughout the source-consumer circuit). Among the many elements that should be defined by this document, mechanisms for ensuring the flexibility and instruments for quick access of all participants thereto and the development of cheap systems to guarantee commercial operations are primary.
• Lack of policies against energy poverty and for supporting vulnerable customers by real methods, but also allowing the elimination of preferential prices and of the regulated market.
• Lack of a Competent Authority at the level of the entire energy system (not only in the gas sector), which would define preventive/reactive plans for emergency situations, monitor and intervene according to principles that would not affect the commercial activity.
• Direct and indirect manipulation of the gas market using the primary or secondary legislation, an approach entirely incompatible with the idea of MARKET RULE.

 

3. Incomplete and incoherent text of the Network Code

Lack of the following principles from the text of the Network Code:

• Trade mechanisms that facilitate capacity trading through transparent, flexible, fair and easy to apply mechanisms, including intraday.
• Only the one who makes a mistake pays and only for its act in relation to responsibilities undertaken under contracts with the transmission operator.
• The price of the mistake is the one set by the Romanian market at the time of making the mistake (not before or after the deed).
• Speculative lawful purpose, allowing the apparition of counterparties in the market to punish indolence of certain users.
• Commercial balancing, seconded by physical and hydraulic balancing.
• The way in which the transmission operator will pay for its mistakes (failure to meet contractual conditions in terms of making available the booked capacity and ensuring the continuity in supply, if it is due to other network users), in relation to those who make mistakes, the price of the transmission operator’s mistake being also necessary to be determined by the Romanian market at the time of the mistake.
• The equitable, fair and non-discriminatory allocation of the transported amounts, in line with the Civil Code, for entry points and exit points into/from the transmission system.

Note: This allocation should not be mistaken, but aligned with the modality of allocation from supply contracts (which are not subject to the Transmission Network Code, being a rule that should result from a future Gas Market Code) and complementary to the allocation of quantities distributed or stored (which are not subject either to the Transmission Network Code, Distribution Network Code and Storage Code being necessary).

 

4. Nonexistence of flexibility mechanisms in the Romanian gas market

• Lack of possibility to store gas throughout the year depending on supply and demand, in:
• Underground storage facilities;
• Transmission/distribution pipelines;
• Systems placed at consumers.
• Lack of mechanisms for sale in interruptible regime
• Lack of mechanisms for interruptible capacities
• Lack of introduction of gas titles as exchange element, for gas sale by gas consumers or/and as guarantee element
• Lack of introduction of receipt as exchange element or/and as guarantee element
• Stimulating the development in the market of new products ensuring higher flexibility (loaning, parking)

 

5. Lack of IT Platforms and modality for data transmission

• Lack of computerization of the activity in the gas market by developing systems for the storage and transmission of information between operators, suppliers, balancing market operator, gas exchanges, competent authority etc.
• Lack of platforms for booking/trading in the main and secondary market of:
• Transmission capacity;
• Distribution capacity;
• Storage capacity.
• Lack of sale/nomination/allocation platforms:
• Gas sale/purchase;
• Transmission services;
• Distribution services;
• Storage services;
• Pipeline storage services;
• Flexibility services (loaning, parking, limitation of price volatility by stop-limit etc.).
• Lack of system balancing platforms with the existence of at least 5 sub-platforms:
• Trade balancing by buy/sell orders ex-ante for the day ahead/intraday;
• Trade balancing by placing bonds (anticipative) for the day ahead/intraday;
• Ex-post trade balancing by buy/sell orders;
• Physical/hydraulic balancing of the system by placing orders (anticipative) for the day ahead/intraday;
• Physical/hydraulic balancing of the NTS by placing bonds (anticipative) for the day ahead/intraday.
• Lack of matching platforms, clearing platforms, platforms for tracking bad-payers, for trading gas titles and receipts etc.

 

6. Sabotage of the Network Code implementation process

In my opinion, the history of the 10 years of failure of the Network Code couldn’t be achieved without sabotaging this process.

 

7. Incompetence

Another important aspect of non-application of the Network Code is due to misunderstanding of the free market philosophy, rules and role of a Network Code, doubled by the incompetence of certain people who believe that ‘gas flows anyway’.

 

The Intelligent Energy Association will continue its steps, aiming to carry out analyses and debates on set of rules ensuring market functioning in Romania.